The course consists of a one-week intensive introduction to the topics of the course, given by Sven Rosenkranz (27/01/2025 to 31/01/2025), followed by a one-week intensive course given by Prof. Fabrice Correia from the University of Geneva, Switzerland (03/02/2025 to 07/02/2025). The aim of the course is to cover some of the main currents in contemporary metaphysics of time, with special emphasis on realist theories of tense, permanentist and temporaryist ontologies, the logic and semantics of future contingents, and the extent to which relativistic physics poses a threat to certain metaphysical theories of time.
Structure and Contents
Views about tensed discourse
What is tensed discourse? What are the assumptions about tense that underlie temporal logic? What does it mean ‘to take tense seriously’ in the context of metaphysical enquiry?
The A-theory and the B-theory of time
Traditionally, metaphysical theories of time are distinguished into so-called A-theories and B-theories. Similarly, some theories are typically characterised as ‘dynamic’ and others as ‘static’. What do these distinctions amount to?
Temporal ontology: presentism, the growing block theory, and permanentism
Presentists typically hold that everything is present, while the growing block theory is typically glossed as the view that some things are present, some things past, while everything is either present or past. Permanentism also countenances things that are future. How do we have to understand the universal quantifier in each case? What does it mean to say that something is past, or that it is present, or that it is future?
The problem of future contingents
Future contingents are statements about the future whose truth-value is not predetermined by what is going on in the present or was going on in the past. Can such statements still have a determinate truth-value? How does this question relate to the question of whether the future is open?
Identity through time
What is it for an object to persist through time? Do objects that so persist have temporal parts? Does change imply identity through time? Can an object be self-identical even at times when it does not exist?
Time travel
Is time travel at all conceptually possible? If it is not, why not? If it is, then what is the best account of what is going on when someone travels through time? And what metaphysical claims does it presuppose?
A-theories and B-theories of time in a relativistic setting
Classical theories of time presume a clear separation of time and space and think of time as akin to a line that each moment divides into past, present, and future. Relativistic physics challenges these assumptions. What can philosophers of time say in response?