A perennial and important topic in philosophy of science is how to think about objectivity in, and the objectivity of, science. What does it mean to say that science gives us objective knowledge about the world? Or that scientists adopt an objective, impartial or value-free stance in their work? Despite centuries of philosophical works problematizing the notion of scientific objectivity, there remains a pervasive belief – in our culture in general, but also in the scientific and philosophical communities – that in some sense the trustworthiness of science is linked to its ideal aim of objectivity. Can any clear and defensible understanding of ideal objectivity in science be given? And if this is not possible, what are the implications for public (and policy-maker's) trust in science?
The course will divide into three blocks:
1. The first block (2 – 3 weeks) will review some central background material (concepts and terminology) for philosophy of science in general, with special emphasis on the notion of causation, and then turn to a general overview of the problems of scientific objectivity and trust in science.
The remaining two thematic blocks of the course will divide into:
2. Epistemic objectivity and causal inferences in science
3. Ontological objectivity: Are the causes, entities and processes postulated in scientific work objectively real?
In blocks 2 and 3, we will frequently be dealing with causation, and the inferences about causation that scientists make. Empirical science often aims at identifying the cause or causes of some phenomenon of interest (of disease, climate change, surface erosion, biological traits, social processes etc). We will ask: In what senses are the kinds of causal relationships studied within empirical sciences, particularly life sciences, “objective” and in what senses not? Answering this question involves (1) understanding the underlying concept of causation that a given example of empirical research operates with, (2) disambiguating different notions of being objective and examining examples of how a causal relationship identified by empirical methods may succeed or fail to be objective in these different senses. Implications for how to evaluate, interpret and apply scientific findings will be addressed as well.
Block 1:
1. Overview of basic concepts & terminology
2. Introduction to objectivity in science
3. Introduction to the basics of causal inference
Readings:
· Reiss, Julian and Jan Sprenger, "Scientific Objectivity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/scientific-objectivity/
· Woodward, James. 2003. Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford University Press.
· Cartwright, N., “Causal Laws and Effective Strategies”,
Block 2:
4. Why are so many scientific research “findings” false?
5. RCTs & other varieties of causal evidence: what is a trustworthy method?
Readings:
· Machery, E., Should We Trust Science? (title tentative; forthcoming book)
· Ioannidis, J., 2005, “Why Most Published Research Findings Are False”, PloS Medicine, 2(8): e124. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124
· Hoefer, C., 2024, “Physical vs Biomedical Sciences: Only the Latter Needs RCTs, but Both Require Careful and Honest Methodology”, in F. Russo & P. Illari (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Causality and Causal Methods, Taylor & Francis, 2024. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003528937-33.
Block 3:
6. Social construction of scientific kinds?
7. How subjective factors bear upon causal selection and explanatory relevance
8. In what sense are scientific variables (not) objective?
Readings:
· Hacking, Ian. 1999. The Social Construction of What? Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. - locus classic
· Potochnik, Angela. 2016. “Scientific Explanation: Putting Communication First.” Philosophy of Science 83(5):721–32. doi:10.1086/687858.
· Lynch, Kate E. 2017. “Heritability and Causal Reasoning.” Biology & Philosophy 32(1):25–49. doi:10.1007/s10539-016-9535-1
· Godman, Marion, and Martin Bellander. 2024. “Latent Variables, Psychological Constructs, and the Prospect of Scientific Kinds in Psychology.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. doi:10.1086/733192.
· Khalidi, Muhammad Ali. 2015. “Three Kinds of Social Kinds.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90(1):96–112. doi:10.1111/phpr.12020.